

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

25 August 1982

NOTE FOR: Ambassador Holdridge

SUBJECT : Your Questions Regarding
Reequipping Vietnamese Troops

Attached is a commentary on recent
Vietnamese activity in Kampuchea concerning
equipment upgrades, changing logistics
capabilities, and Vietnamese troop strength.



Dave Gries

cc: Nat Bellochi

TOP SECRET

We believe that the majority of new troops sent to Kampuchea will be deployed in the western region but the evidence is not conclusive that total Vietnamese troop strength adjacent to the border will increase. [REDACTED]

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We have been expecting the upgrading of equipment used by Kampuchean theater forces. Over the past 3 years Hanoi has funneled almost all new Soviet-supplied equipment and arms toward its border with China. Now that reinforcements there are slowing, Kampuchea has been given a higher priority. The amount of US equipment in Vietnam remaining operational has dropped considerably in all categories. Soviet deliveries are filling the gaps as US equipment leaves the inventory. [REDACTED]

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The improvement of logistics capabilities has been going on for over a year and probably is intended in large measure to support major strong points located 30-40 kms from the border and prevent DK troops from expanding their zones of operations. [REDACTED]

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Several factors help explain Vietnam's greater aggressiveness this wet season. First, portions of western Kampuchea have received less than normal amounts of rainfall, a situation favoring the Vietnamese. Areas near Thmar Pouk, for example, have been described as drought stricken. Second, improved logistics and forward stockpiling have allowed Vietnamese outposts to mount more frequent sweep operations. Third, keeping the guerrillas on the defensive allows newly arrived troops replacements more time to adjust and prepare for the dry season. [REDACTED]

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We also believe another aggressive Vietnamese dry season campaign is likely. Nevertheless, we do not expect the Vietnamese to be able to destroy the resistance. [REDACTED]
Vietnamese were able to push resistance forces out of several of their major bases [REDACTED]

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